




Abstract: In recent years substantial effort has been expended by scholars to
better understand the nature of the ancient interest in divination. This study will
argue that the Stoic philosopher Epictetus’ views of divination have been largely
overlooked and mistakenly defined by his modern interpreters. While often
portrayed as being opposed to the art, it is proposed that he envisages divina-
tion can be beneficially employed: namely in highlighting certain moral actions,
and in motivating individuals to commence philosophical study.
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Epictetus’ Views of Divination
The widespread concord that existed between the ancient philosophical schools
(excepting the Epicurean one) that through divination the course of future
events could be made known to humans, has been reflected upon in modern
scholarship, as well as in ancient sources.1 Within each respective school,
however, different emphases and levels of commitment to explicate the nature
of divination manifest themselves. Regarding Stoic philosophy though, as Peter
Struck, in his recent monograph on divination and philosophy in antiquity,
comments, divination was ‘a subject of abiding interest’ and ‘no other ancient
philosophical school took the topic as seriously as they did.’2 Proponents of the
Stoa who are documented as displaying an interest in the art (τέχνη) include
prominent individuals such as Zeno, Chrysippus, Diogenes of Babylon, Antipater
*Corresponding author: Erlend D. MacGillivray, University of Aberdeen King’s College,
Aberdeen AB24 3FX, Scotland, E-mail: erlendmacgillivray@gmail.com
1 At Div 1.3.5–6 Cicero highlights that while Xenophon and Epicurus objected to the validity of
divination, the members of the Old Academy, the Peripatetics, and the Stoa accepted its
legitimacy and usefulness. For a more positive account, however, of Xenophon’s attitude
towards divination and its potential profitable uses see Mikalson (2010), 118, and Danzig
(2010), 258. For recent studies on ancient divination, consider, for instance, Mikalson (2010),
110–39, Struck (2016).
2 Struck (2016), 173. On Stoicism and divination see also Hankinson (1988).
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of Tarsus, and Seneca.3 The wide agreement that was sustained in the Stoic
school regarding the use and validity of divination was commented upon by
ancient writers such as Cicero,4 and, additionally, we can note that throughout
his treatise on the topic, De Divinatione, Cicero selects Stoic interlocutors to
voice a defense of the profitable utility that it can be employed to meet.5
Despite the scholarly interest in ancient beliefs in divination, little attention
has been devoted to consider or plot the attitude that the Stoic philosopher
Epictetus (ca. 55–135 C.E.) has towards it, although a recent study by Gary Gabor
profitably comments upon one section in the Enchiridion (and then proceeds to
explore the Neoplatonist Simplicius’ exposition of the passage) which we will
note below. The lack of interest from scholars to appraise Epictetus’ opinion of
divination is somewhat perplexing for, as we shall see, it is a subject that he
raises with regularity during the course of his discussions, and even a section in
the Discourses and the Enchiridion are, respectively, dedicated to explore the
topic.6 When scholars do remark upon Epictetus’ stance towards divination, they
almost uniformly present him as castigating its value and potential use.
Consider, for instance, that in his notable monograph on Epictetus’ thought,
A. A. Long’s only passing reference to the philosopher’s opinion of divination
(based upon the remarks at Diss I.17) is to opine that Epictetus believed: ‘The
divination we should practice is the study of the world’s and our own natures
and not recourse to omens and augury.’7 As we have briefly highlighted above,
this conclusion would make Epictetus’ position on divination strikingly discor-
dant from those that his fellow Stoics held.
Despite the frequency of his reflections on divination, our understanding of
Epictetus’ position of it is impeded (and this might also account for the lack of
scholarly interest that has been directed to the topic) by the fact that no
extended account details the, obviously complex, boundaries that he holds
should govern its utilization. Furthermore, an unhelpful habit in contemporary
scholarship of highlighting one of Epictetus’ scattered comments on divination
and presuming that it represents the totality of his thought on the matter is
evident. To address this oversight this paper will attempt to collate, and then
interpret, Epictetus’ disparate reflections on divination. Once achieved it will be
3 See Bobzien (1999), 144–79, Jedan (2009), 23, 29–30, Williams (2012), 312–13, 319–324, and
Struck (2016), 171–214.
4 Acad 1.207.
5 We should also note that recent scholarship has argued the once considered skepticism that
the Stoic Panaetius (185–110 C.E.) held towards divination can no longer be sustained, so see
Brouwer (2012), 20–2.
6 Diss III.1.36–7, and Ench 18.
7 Long (2002), 178–9.
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argued that his stance regarding the art has been regularly mischaracterised,
and insights into his opinion regarding it potential benefits obscured in the
writings of his modern interpreters.
In all of Epictetus’ deliberations on divination, his confidence in its ability to
render the course of future events known is evident. As we shall see, the records
of his discussions present us with a catalogue of the numerous channels where
he believes such foreknowledge might be gleaned, e. g., bird displays, incuba-
tions, dreams, oracles, and sacrificial inspection. More often, however, he is
concerned to ensure that his students will form correct opinions regarding the
appropriate use of divination. For instance, he reminds them that if they
encounter a raven whose croaking can disclose the course of future events to
them, they should remain aware that it is only an intermediary for god, who is
the true source of the revelation,8 and elsewhere he cautions them that it can be
a sign of cowardice (δειλία) if a person constantly (συνεχής) seeks divination.9
Some of Epictetus’ attempts to reorient his students’ opinions on divination,
however, have been interpreted by scholars as tendering a broad critique of the
practice, and that he is of the conclusion that divination is devoid of any benefit
that makes it worthy of pursuit. So, in one passage, and after noting that the
writings of Chrysippus are only a vehicle for gaining knowledge of nature, he
proceeds to similarly argue:
Nor do we need a diviner [or sacrificer – θύτης] on his own account, but because we think
that through him we will be able to understand future events, and the signs sent by the
gods; nor do we need the entrails of the victims on their own account, but because it is
through them that the signs are sent; neither is it the raven or the crow that we admire, but
the god who sends his signs through them … These things, says the diviner, I find in the
victims. These are the signs that you have been sent. If you wish it, you are free. If you
wish it, you will have no one to blame, no one to accuse. Everything will be in accordance
with your own mind, and equally, with the mind of god. It is for this prophecy that I go to
the diviner and the philosopher, not to admire the man on account of his interpretation,
but to admire the interpretations itself.10
8 Diss III.1.36–7.
9 Diss II.7.9.
10 Diss I.17.18–19, 28–9: µὴ φέρε οὖν πρὸς τὸν µάντιν ὄρεξιν ἢ ἔκκλισιν µηδὲ τρέµων αὐτῷ
πρόσει, ἀλλὰ διεγνωκώς, ὅτι πᾶν τὸ ἀποβησόµενον ἀδιάφορον καὶ οὐδὲν πρὸς σέ, ὁποῖον δ᾽ ἂν ᾖ,
ἔσται αὐτῷ χρήσασθαι καλῶς καὶ τοῦτο οὐθεὶς κωλύσει. θαῤῥῶν οὖν ὡς ἐπὶ συµβούλους ἔρχου
τοὺς θεούς: καὶ λοιπόν, ὅταν τί σοι συµβουλευθῇ, µέµνησο τίνας συµβούλους παρέλαβες κα ὶ
τίνων παρακούσεις ἀπειθήσας. ἔρχου δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ µαντεύεσθαι, καθάπερ ἠξίου Σωκράτης, ἐφ᾽ ὧν ἡ
πᾶσα σκέψις τὴν ἀναφορὰν εἰς τὴν ἔκβασιν ἔχει καὶ οὔτε ἐκ λόγου οὔτε ἐκ τέχνης τινὸς ἄλλης
ἀφορµαὶ δίδονται πρὸς τὸ συνιδεῖν τὸ προκείµενον: Please note, unless otherwise stated all
translations of Epictetus are based upon Gill and Hard (1995).
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It is to this passage that almost all readers of modern scholarship are
directed when consideration of Epictetus’ stance towards divination is raised,
and which, therefore, inevitably colours their understanding of his conception of
its worth. The interpretation that greets them is that by asserting we do not need
the diviner (§18–19, οὐ δὲ γὰρ τοῦ θύτου δι᾽ αὐτόν) as they do not produce the
divination but merely channel it, and by depicting the diviner as voicing the
results of Stoic philosophy (§28–9), Epictetus is contending that any use the
practice once held has been obviated by philosophy. Indeed, modern inter-
preters of Epictetus argue, only the rather remarkable occurrence of divination
being used to voice foundational teachings of Stoicism would, in Epictetus’
view, render its service to be of value for his students. Such conclusions have
been offered since at least Xenakis’ 1969 study on Epictetus’ thought,11 and is a
viewpoint that is well-articulated by Maria Colish’s later reflection that Epictetus
‘rejects’ divination because: ‘it is unnecessary in the light of man’s possession of
reason, which enables him to judge what to do without recourse to external
pointers.’12 Furthermore, Robert Dobbin states on this passage that Epictetus
believes:
philosophy helps render divination otiose … By equating his seer with a philosopher in
[Diss I.17.]29, E[pictetus] implies as much. This ideal seer fulfils his duty by transmitting
the message for mankind ascribed to Zeus at [Diss] 1. 10–13 … The Stoic — or better,
Epictetan — seer is paradoxical because he would end up putting himself out of business.13
Other scholars such as Gerald Downing,14 and A. A. Long, (whose comments we
noted at the beginning of this study), have continued to present Epictetus’
opinion of divination in this manner, and have done so by appealing to this
text. Yet in probing this interpretation, we must note that Epictetus’ portrayal
does not offer any explicit appraisal of the possible uses of divination, and
certainly nowhere does he posit its redundancy. The conclusion that the scho-
lars listed above have reached is an inferred one, and risks, I believe, over-
extending Epictetus’ comments to bear upon issues on the worth of the practice
that he does not necessarily seek to address. Merely placing Stoic tenets in the
mouth of a diviner does not exclude the possibility that he might elsewhere
depict the custom as fulfilling a profitable role. Neither does his statement
regarding diviners only being the vehicle, and not source, of divination imply
that he considers their role to be superfluous, any more than he would view
11 Xenakis (1969), 54.
12 Colish (1984), 33.
13 Dobbin (1998), 167.
14 Downing (1992), 42.
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Chrysippus’ writings in such a manner because they merely disclose, and do not
originate the intricacies of nature (φύσις).15 But for us to be able to ascertain
whether this is the case or not, the careful collation and interpretation of
Epictetus’ other remarks on divination have to be undertaken - a task that we
will attempt to achieve here.
The second passage where we can start to refine our understanding of
Epictetus’ opinion on divination records him arguing:
because we consult diviners when there is no occasion for us to do so, many of us fail to
carry out many appropriate actions. For what can the diviner see besides death, or danger,
or sickness, or, in general, things of that kind. If it becomes necessary, then, to risk my life
for a friend, or if it is appropriate for me even to die for him, what occasion have I to
consult a diviner? Have I not the diviner within me, who has told me the true nature of
good and evil, and has expounded the signs that indicate both? What further need have I,
then, of the entrails of victims or the flight of birds? Can I bear with a diviner when he says,
“This is expedient for you?” For does he know what is expedient for me? Does he know
what good is? Has he learned the signs that indicate good and evil as he has learned the
signs in the entrails? … What should we do, then? We should come to them without desire
or aversion, just as a traveller asks somebody he meets which of two roads to take, without
having any particular desire to travel on the right- hand road rather than the left; for he
does not wish to travel on one of them in particular, but on the one that will lead him to
where he wants to go.16
This passage might seem to support the conclusions of the scholars we noted
above by providing an explicit critique from Epictetus on divination, as well as
supplying the reasons for the hostility they conclude he directs towards it.
Diviners are, after all, depicted as being ignorant (§4–7), and divination a
practice that is sought after because of an erroneous concern for externals (§2–
3). Philosophy, meanwhile, is presented as being a reliable internal diviner of
god’s will that can accurately pilot its adherents throughout life (§3–4).
Significantly though, alongside the above criticism that Epictetus raises against
divination are interspaced comments where he intimates that there are suitable
15 See Diss I.17.15–18. On Epictetus commending his writings see Diss II.6.8, IV.9.6.
16 Diss II.7.1–5,10. διὰ τὸ ἀκαίρως µαντεύεσθαι πολλοὶ καθήκοντα πολλὰ παραλείποµεν. τί γὰρ ὁ
µάντις δύναται πλέον ἰδεῖν θανάτου ἢ κινδύνου ἢ νόσου ἢ ὅλως τῶν τοιούτων; ἂν οὖν δέῃ
κινδυνεῦσαι ὑπὲρ τοῦ φίλου, ἂν δὲ καὶ ἀποθανεῖν ὑπὲρ αὐτο ῦ καθήκῃ, ποῦ µοι καιρὸς ἔτι
µαντεύεσθαι; οὐκ ἔχω τὸν µάντιν ἔσω τὸν εἰρηκότα µοι τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ,
τὸν ἐξηγηµένον τὰ σηµεῖα ἀµφοτέρων; τί οὖν ἔτι χρείαν ἔχω τῶν σπλάγχνων ἢ τῶν οἰωνῶν; ἀλλ᾽
ἀνέχοµαι λέγοντος ἐκείνου ‘συµφέρει σοι;’ τί γάρ ἐστι συµφέρον οἶδεν; τί ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν οἶδεν;
µεµάθηκεν ὥσπερ τὰ σηµεῖα τῶν σπλάγχνων οὕτως σηµεῖα τίνα ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν; … τί οὖν; δεῖ
δίχα ὀρέξεως ἔρχεσθαι καὶ ἐκκλίσεως, ὡς ὁ ὁδοιπόρος πυνθάνεται παρὰ τοῦ ἀπαντήσαντος,
ποτέραν τῶν ὁδῶν φέρει, οὐκ ἔχων ὄρεξιν πρὸς τὸ τὴν δεξιὰν μᾶλλον φέρειν ἢ τὴν ἀριστεράν:
οὐ γὰρ τούτων τινὰ ἀπελθεῖν θέλει, ἀλλὰ τὴν φέρουσαν.
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occasions where divination can be employed, and, indeed, that he anticipates
his students might have cause to seek its assistance. At the start of this critique,
Epictetus argues that the danger from the art arises when people consult
diviners improperly (ἀκαίρως). This is an important qualification, for it clarifies
that Epictetus’ proceeding critique is not being directed to pierce the practice
itself, but is rather delimited to focus upon a specific, though certainly popular,
misapplication of it. Furthermore, his critique of divination as placing a false
value on externals (§10) is not appended with the conclusion that the art is
therefore void of any use and should be evaded, but rather that when we go we
should avoid bringing mistaken conceptions to it.
Even the title of this chapter, ‘How we are to use divination’ (πῶς
µαντευτέον) surely evinces that he believes there is a beneficial purpose to
which divination can be employed. Epictetus, then, is patently not launching
an assault on divination, but is seeking to remove the false and troublesome
assumptions that often accompany its use. To clarify if, and how, he believes
divination might be profitably used we shall have to continue in our task of
searching through the record of his thought.
Epictetus’ Positive Views of Divination
What beneficial role(s) might Epictetus conceive divination fulfils? The first text,
I suggest, that can help us to better comprehend the horizons of his thought on
this matter reads:
do not, therefore, bring either desire or aversion with you to the diviner, and do not
approach him with trembling, but after first being clear in your mind that every outcome is
indifferent and nothing to you and that, whatever its nature may be, it will be in your
power to make good use of it, and this no one can hinder. So go with confidence to the
gods, as your counsellors, and afterwards, when some counsel has been granted to you,
remember whom you have taken as your counsellors, and whom you will be disregarding
if you disobey. Resort to divination, as Socrates thought right, in cases of which the whole
inquiry turns upon the outcome, and in which no opportunities are afforded by reason, or
any other art, to discover what lies before one.17
17 Ench 32: μὴ φέρε οὖν πρὸς τὸν μάντιν ὄρεξιν ἢ ἔκκλισιν μηδὲ τρέμων αὐτῷ πρόσει, ἀλλὰ
διεγνωκώς, ὅτι πᾶν τὸ ἀποβησόμενον ἀδιάφορον καὶ οὐδὲν πρὸς σέ, ὁποῖον δ᾽ ἂν ᾖ, ἔσται αὐτῷ
χρήσασθαι καλῶς καὶ τοῦτο οὐθεὶς κωλύσει. θαῤῥῶν οὖν ὡς ἐπὶ συμβούλους ἔρχου τοὺς θεούς:
καὶ λοιπόν, ὅταν τί σοι συμβουλευθῇ, μέμνησο τίνας.
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Here, Epictetus provides a more expansive account which confirms his
anticipation that, once they are fortified with the appropriate perception of the
true worth of externals, his students can constructively utilize the mantic. Of
further interest for us, though, is that he continues to detail the reasons why his
students might find divination to be beneficial. In apparent imitation of
Socrates, Epictetus advises that they should seek divination when the right
course of action they should take entirely depends upon knowing the outcome
of an event that is otherwise unpredictable.18 Once informed about the course
that fate (or εἱµαρµένη — a key Stoic belief19) has set, Epictetus believes they
should be able to deduce how they can align their assent and future actions with
nature’s purposes. Divination, as Gary Gabor has also noted,20 is therefore
viewed by Epictetus as being a potential aid in elucidating moral actions. This
runs directly contrary to the statement that Luke Timothy Johnson makes
regarding this passage that: ‘he [Epictetus] does not question that divination
can reveal circumstances, but he insists that whatever the circumstances, the
philosopher already knows how to exercise his moral purpose.’21 Although it
firmly meshes with the prevailing scholarly colouring of Epictetus’ views on
divination, as we have just seen Johnson’s interpretation actually inverts the
meaning of his remarks; namely that there are occasions when reason on its own
cannot suffice to guide people in how they should act, but that the services of
divination can be employed to resolve, or at least temper, this limitation.
It is also worthwhile to highlight that in the above section Epictetus is
articulating a seemingly widely held Stoic position. That divination and knowl-
edge of the future can aid people in making ethical choices was a stance that
was advocated by members of the school from Chrysippus to Marcus Aurelius.22
Furthermore, we can note that an argument Cicero’s Stoic interlocutor in his On
Divination is portrayed as making in the art’s defense is that: ‘nor is it of no
advantage to us to know what will come to pass for we will be more careful if we
18 For Socrates and divination see Mem 1.1.6–9, and the discussion in Gabor (2014), 331–2.
19 As Struck (2016), 196, notes, informing the Stoics’ on regarding divination was their under-
standing that: “Since nothing happens outside of the divine architecture of interlocking causes,
nothing happens that is casually undetermined from what came before. This means that
knowledge of the state of affairs at one time allows for projections about what the state of
affairs will be at a future time.”
See further his remarks at Struck (2016), pp.177–80, 195, and also De Nat 2.58, Ep 65.2, De Div
1.110, 127, Diog Laert 7.142–3. On Stoicism and their understanding of fate and determinism see
Bobzien (1999).
20 See especially his comments in this regard at Gabor (2014), 329, 333.
21 Johnson (2009), 74.
22 E. g., Chrysippus apud Div 2. 63, 166, Seneca Nat Quest 38.4, and M Aur Med 9.27.
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know’ (neque nostra nihil interest scire ea, quae eventura sunt erimus enim
cautiores si sciemus),23 i. e., through divination the philosopher can be afforded
the advantage of having time to consider how they should respond to forth-
coming events.
Continuing to verify that divination can aid the philosopher in informing
their actions, Epictetus elsewhere comments:
Thus the philosophers are right to say that if a wise and good man had foreknowledge of
events, he would work to assist nature even when it comes to sickness and death and
mutilation, being aware that these things are allotted in accordance with the ordering of
the universe, and that the whole is more sovereign that the part, and the city than the
citizen.24
From this passage we can see that Epictetus believes knowledge of the future
can assist people to work with (συνεργέω) the order (διάταξις) of nature, even if
its desire is to lead them through bodily suffering (a conviction that Marcus
Aurelius will also relay several decades later25). Another relevant passage in this
regard emerges when Epictetus chastises his students for their apparent laxity in
applying philosophical truths to their lives, and then asks them
Who of us ever slept in a temple to learn (µάντιν) the manner in which he should act? I say,
who? Give me a single man, that I may see what I have long sought, a man who is truly
noble and gifted; whether he be young or old, give me one such man.26
23 Div 1.82. On this passage, Flower (2009), 106, observes: “The chief difference between
Xenophon and Chrysippus seems to be the latter’s assumption that the gods are concerned
for all mortals. By contrast, Xenophon … that they support their favorite among mortals but that
this support is fickle.” However, on Xenophon’s opinion that divination can show the care of
the gods for humanity, see Mikalson (2010), 118.
24 Diss II.10.5: διὰ τοῦτο καλῶς λέγουσιν οἱ φιλόσοφοι ὅτι εἰ προῄδει ὁ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς τὰ
ἐσόμενα, συνήργει ἂν καὶ τῷ νοσεῖν καὶ τῷ ἀποθνῄσκειν καὶ τῷ πηροῦσθαι, αἰσθανόμενός γε, ὅτι
ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν ὅλων διατάξεως τοῦτο ἀπονέμεται, κυριώτερον δὲ τὸ ὅλον τοῦ μέρους καὶ ἡ πόλις
τοῦ πολίτου. It should be noted, though, that Epictetus later states, Diss II.10.6: “But since we
cannot know beforehand what will happen, it is our duty to hold fast to things that are naturally
more suited to be chosen, because that is what we are born to”, (νῦν δ᾽ ὅτι οὐ προγιγνώσκομεν,
καθήκει τῶν πρὸς ἐκλογὴν εὐφυεστέρων ἔχεσθαι, ὅτι καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο γεγόναμεν). This seems to
be a statement on humanity’s general inability to know the course of future events. Epictetus’
frequent remarks on the accuracy of divination elsewhere seem to preclude concluding
otherwise.
25 See M Aur Med 4.33–4, and also the useful comments on its meaning in Gill (2013), 136.
26 Diss II.16.17: τίς ἡμῶν τούτου ἕνεκα μάντιν παρέλαβεν; τίς ἡμῶν οὐκ ἐνεκοιμήθη ὑπὲρ
ἐνεργείας; τίς; ἕνα μοι δότε, ἵνα ἴδω τοῦτον, ὃν ἐκ πολλοῦ χρόνου ζητῶ, τὸν ταῖς ἀληθείαις
εὐγενῆ καὶ εὐφυᾶ: εἴτε νέον εἴτε πρεσβύτερον, δότε.
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Here Epictetus references two methods of divination, visiting a diviner, and
sleeping inside of a temple. While the first technique is one of the most
recognizable components of ancient divination, the attempt to induce revelation
from the gods while sleeping, especially while inside a temple, is perhaps a less
familiar convention to us. This practice, nevertheless, is referenced by numerous
ancient philosophers,27 including — significantly for our purposes — several
Stoic thinkers such as Chrysippus, Antipater of Tarsus, and Posidonius.28 It is
unlikely though, I suggest, that Epictetus is intending to recommend that his
students should regularly supplement their studies with varied attempts to
receive mantic insight. His intention, instead, appears to be to highlight the
lengths that he believes his students should be prepared to go to so they can
discern what the correct actions they should pursue are. Nevertheless, in his
efforts to confront his students’ lack of resolve to appropriately reform their
lives, Epictetus has been prompted to disclose information regarding his percep-
tion of divination, and has, once more, done so with an approving tone.
There are several sections in the Discourses where an additional — and, so
far largely, ignored — function that Epictetus holds divination can fulfil is
apparent: that of revealing kernel philosophical truths to humanity and direct-
ing individuals to lead a life that is dedicated to philosophical study and
exposition.
In the first text for our consideration (Diss III.1), Epictetus is depicted as
being approached by a young student of rhetoric who is seeking advice from the
philosopher on how he might live virtuously. It becomes clear, however, (§10–
14) that Epictetus judges the young man lacks the disposition and understand-
ing that he needs before he can benefit from the instruction that he has
requested. Although Epictetus considers ceasing this likely futile conversation,
he nevertheless deliberates: ‘[but] if you should at some future time lay this
charge [of silence] against me, what defence could I make?’29 He compares this
situation with those that faced Apollo and Socrates:
You may as well ask, why is he Apollo, and why does he deliver oracles, why has he
placed himself in such a post as a prophet and fountain of truth, for the inhabitants of the
27 E. g., consider the helpful catalogue of such references at Bar-Kochva (2010), 387 n.94 and
388 n.95, and especially Cicero Div 1.96. On Socrates’ confidence in divination occurring
through dreams see Phd 60e2 and 61a8–b1. On these passages, Mikalson (2010), 121, comments:
“for Socrates such a dream was god-sent, gave instructions, and needed to be interpreted and
obeyed.” Consider also his comments at (2010), 120–4, on the understanding across ancient
philosophical traditions that divination can be received through dreams.
28 See Div I.39, 63, 129. See also the discussion in Bar-Kochva (2010), 388.
29 Diss III.1.16: τοῦτό µοι ὕστερον ἂν ἐγκαλῇς, τί ἕξω ἀπολογήσασθαι.
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whole civilized world to resort to? Why is “Know Thyself” inscribed on the front of his
temple, even if nobody heeds it. Did Socrates persuade all who came to him, to take proper
care of themselves? Not one in a thousand.30
After reflecting upon their examples, Epictetus resolves to continue to outline
key philosophical tenets to the young man. Of significance for our concerns is
that while Socrates’ role in confronting society with philosophy is well known,
Epictetus’ description of Apollo as serving a similar function, but by giving
prophecies/oracles (χρησµῳδέω) that are directed to the whole civilized world,
and that are then disseminated in inscriptions and maxims, is perhaps less so.
We should again note, however, that such an understanding is common place in
the ancient perception of divination.31
The belief that the maxim ‘know thyself’ (γνῶθι σαὐτόν), which was famously
inscribed on the temple at Delphi, was either given by Apollo (as Epictetus
suggests in this passage), or was crafted by one or all of the seven sages, is
attested across the philosophical schools,32 as is the understanding that it com-
mends an enterprise that should be pursued through philosophical deliberation.33
Epictetus, however, intimates an awareness that only a slight uptake of its appeal
for self-reflection will ever likely occur. Several classical authors though attribute
the disclosing of this aphorism as having prompted various individuals to com-
mence their philosophical vocations. For example, Plutarch succinctly comments:
‘how many philosophic inquiries (ζητήσεις) have they [i. e., its words] set on foot,
and what a horde of discourses (λόγοι) has sprung up from each, as from a
seed!’34 This is an ability that Epictetus elsewhere references:
30 Diss III.1.18–19: διὰ τί δὲ Ἀπόλλων ἐστίν; διὰ τί δὲ χρησμῳδεῖ; διὰ τί δ᾽ εἰς ταύτην τὴν χώραν
ἑαυτὸν κατατέταχεν, ὥστε μάντις εἶναι καὶ πηγὴ τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔρχεσθαι τοὺς ἐκ
τῆς οἰκουμένης; διὰ τί δὲ προγέγραπται τὸ γνῶθι σαυτὸν μηδενὸς αὐτὸ νοοῦντος; Σωκράτης
πάντας ἔπειθε τοὺς προσιό ντας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἑαυτῶν; οὐδὲ τὸ χιλιοστὸν μέρος. On Epictetus’
comments here see also Sevenster (1966), 252, and Lipsey (2001), 247.
31 On the Stoics believing that divination can come through oracles, dreams, and prophecies
see Acad. 2.107, and the discussion in Struck (2016), 174. Mikalson (2010), 119, notes: “the
Delphic Oracle and some other forms of divination [had a] surprisingly respect place” in the
philosophic tradition; see also his discussion on Apollo and divination in Hellenistic philosophy
at (2010), 131–8. In his study on the Delphi oracles, Fontenrose (1978), 314, meanwhile,
observes: “the usual philosopher’s legend” that “the philosopher received his first impulse to
philosophy from the Delphic Oracle.” For broader studies on Apollo and divination see Gigon
(1946), Busine (2005), and Graf (2009), 43–64.
32 Lipsey (2001), 230–1. See also Plato Prt 343a, 343b.
33 E. g., see Plato Phaed 229e, Phlb 48c, Xenophon Mem 4.2.24, Cyr 7.2.20, Dio Or 72.12. On the
history of the saying, and particularly the citation of it in the Platonic tradition, see Tortzen (2002).
34 De E 2 trans. Babbitt (1936), 205. See also the discussion in Lispey (2001), 230–1 and Sellars
(2003), 38 n.23.
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Is, then, the Delphic admonition, “Know thyself”, superfluous? — “surely not”, the man
replies. — If one told the singer in a chorus to know himself, would he not attend to the
order by paying regard to his partners in the chorus and taking care to sing in harmony
with them?— “Yes.” — and likewise with a soldier or a sailor.35
Far from being, as the question at the start of this dialectical exchange rhetori-
cally poses, superfluous (παρέλκω), cognizance of this oracle’s injunction is
used by Epictetus to try to prompt a layman to understand the need he has to
examine his life and actions, and to seek the guidance that philosophy can offer
in this regard.36 We can observe that in the philosophical tradition, oracular
pronouncements are associated with having inaugurated the careers of philoso-
phers such as Socrates,37 Diogenes of Sinope,38 Zeno,39 and Dio of Prusa.40
Importantly for our purposes, I suggest, Epictetus appears to reference this
phenomenon when, while expanding upon the qualifications that are required
of philosophical teachers, he comments:
it may well be that not even wisdom is a sufficient qualification for the care of the young;
one should also have a particular predisposition, by Zeus, and aptitude for this, and the
right bodily build, and, above all, the recommendation from god that one should occupy
this office, as he recommended to Socrates that he should undertake that of cross-examin-
ing people, and to Diogenes that of rebuking people in kingly tones, and to Zeno that of
instructing people and establishing doctrines.41
35 Fr 1: μή τι οὖν καὶ τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς παράγγελμα παρέλκον ἐστί, τὸ Γνῶθι σαυτόν; — τοῦτο δὲ
μὲν οὔ, φησί. — τίς οὖν ἡ δύναμις αὐτοῦ; εἰ χορευτῇ τις παρήγγελλε τὸ γνῶναι ἑαυτόν, οὔκουν
ἂν τῇ προστάξει προσεῖχε τῷ ἐπιστραφῆναι καὶ τῶν συγχορευτῶν καὶ τῆς πρὸς αὐτοὺς
συμφωνίας; — φησίν. — εἰ δὲ ναύτῃ;
36 Dio portrays the Cynic Diogenes arguing in similar language: “Have you ever heard of the
inscription at Delphi: ‘Know thyself?’ ‘I have.’ ‘Is it not plain that the god gives this command to
all, in the belief that they do not know themselves? ’”, trans. Cohoon (1932). See also Or 4.57.
37 Xenophon Ap 14, Plato Ap 22a6–8. On the pivotal nature of this divine calling for Socrates’
conception of his role as a philosopher see Doyle (2012). Bowden (2005), 82, also comments:
“the fact that two disciples of Socrates include this story at the heart of their account of
Socrates’ defence suggests that Delphic approval of Socrates as something valued by his
followers. Both Plato and Xenophon see Delphi as important in their works.”
38 Diog Laert 6.20.
39 Philo Prob 160, and Diog Laert 7.2.
40 Or 13.9.
41 Diss III.21.18–19: οὐδὲ σοφὸν εἶναι τυχὸν ἐξαρκεῖ πρὸς τὸ ἐπιµεληθῆναι νέων: δεῖ δὲ καὶ
προχειρότητά τινα εἶναι καὶ ἐπιτηδειότητα πρὸς τοῦτο, νὴ τὸν Δία, καὶ σῶµα ποιὸν καὶ πρὸ
πάντων τὸν θεὸν συµβουλεύειν ταύτην τὴν χώραν κατασχεῖν, ὡς Σωκράτει συνεβούλευεν τὴν
ἐλεγκτικὴν χώραν ἔχειν, ὡς Διογένει τὴν βασιλικὴν καὶ ἐπιπληκτικήν, ὡς Ζήνωνι τὴν
διδασκαλικὴν καὶ δογµατικήν.
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As we have just seen, the three philosophers that Epictetus mentions (Socrates,
Diogenes and Zeno) all had the commencement of their philosophical careers
credited by some classical authors as being
motivated by the pronouncements of oracles. Epictetus almost certainly has
this in mind when he remarks that they had been ‘recommended’ (συµβουλεύω)
by god to take up their positions: a qualification that he labors was quite
separate from the skills and/or circumstances that otherwise commended them
for their roles.42 We might suppose, though, that it is unlikely that Epictetus
expects every philosopher’s career should be validated by such an explicit
confirmation of their calling; rather it is evident from elsewhere that he holds
philosophy’s candidates should manifest sufficient aptitude for undergoing
training, as well as an implacable and naturally invested compulsion to live
under philosophy’s supervision.43 In some instances, and in-line with broader
ancient opinion, he apparently though holds that this confirmation can be
obtained through divination.
Conclusion
As we have seen, Epictetus’ opinion of divination has been a largely neglected
topic in scholarship. The privileging of a single passage, Diss I.17, and the
misinterpreting of its argument and purpose, has led to him being frequently
portrayed as an opponent of the art.
In this study, however, we have argued that Epictetus’ perception of divina-
tion aligns with broader ancient, as well as Stoic, thought, which is confident in
its validity, and (providing it is not misapplied to serve spurious ends) capacity
to be profitably utilized, and that he expands our knowledge regarding the
numerous benefits ancient philosophers could believe the sciences can bring.
In particular, we have seen it repeatedly evidenced that Epictetus believes
divination can be used to deduce ethical actions when foreknowledge of certain
events is required, and, additionally, to have had a role in prompting several
leading figures to assume their philosophical calling. In this regard oracular
forms of divination (as opposed to augury) appear to be highlighted by Epictetus
as being of particular use. It is hoped that future scholarship on Epictetus will
recognize and, when appropriate, integrate his views of divination into their
42 On this consider also Schofield (2007), 76. On the importance of Epictetus’ understanding
that people are assigned different roles by god/nature, see the recent article by Johnson (2012).
43 So see Diss III.6.9–10.
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account of his thought. Moreover, it is hoped that scholarship on ancient
divination will start to include this important philosophical thinker’s opinions
within their discussions.
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